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Today we know much more about the effects of pretrial detention than we 
did even five years ago. Multiple empirical studies have emerged that shed new 
light on the far-reaching impacts of bail decisions made at the earliest stages of 
the criminal adjudication process.1 This new evidence calls into question 
longstanding approaches to managing pretrial risk that provide limited due 
process protection and emphasize cash bail. 
Making appropriate decisions about who to release pretrial and under what 
conditions requires an understanding of the impacts of particular bail 
requirements. For example, for a given defendant, how would their risk of 
failure to appear (“FTA”) or future criminal activity change if they were 
subjected to condition A (which might include preventative detention) versus 
condition B (which might include an alternative to detention, such as text 
message reminders of scheduled court appearances)? Armed with such 
information, decisionmakers could appropriately balance society’s dual interest 
in preserving public safety and holding the accused accountable with 
defendants’ liberty interests. However, until recently, the actual evidence 
necessary to analyze the trade-off described above has been virtually 
nonexistent, leading judges and magistrates to rely on a combination of personal 
experience (possibly including conscious or unconscious bias), heuristics, and 
local norms in formulating their bail decisions. 
One reason it has been so difficult to develop good evidence of the effects 
of pretrial detention is because the bail system, when operating as intended, 
sorts defendants in a manner that limits the value of the outcome data it 
produces for demonstrating whether and how bail conditions matter. In general, 
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because bail conditions are typically assigned based on perceived defendant risk, 
if we observe elevated violation rates for defendants with condition A versus 
condition B, it is difficult to determine empirically whether this reflects an 
adverse causal effect of condition A or simply the fact that those assigned 
condition A were different from those assigned condition B to begin with. For 
example, proponents of cash bail often cite low FTA rates among those released 
with assistance from commercial bonding agents and argue from such statistics 
that private bondsmen are a necessary component of the system to manage 
nonappearance risk.2 However, comparing FTA rates for those with and 
without commercial sureties is misleading. To maximize profits, commercial 
operations have an incentive to accept only clients who are at low risk of 
nonappearance in the same way that an auto insurer would make money by 
identifying and then insuring only the safest drivers.3 Thus, low FTA rates 
might simply reflect defendant sorting and tell policymakers little about 
commercial sureties’ effectiveness. 
The new generation of pretrial detention studies addresses this difficulty 
and provides a much stronger footing on which to base legal decisions and 
criminal justice policy. Recent studies improve upon past work in at least three 
respects. First, they make use of large administrative datasets, typically 
involving the near universe of criminal offenses within a particular jurisdiction, 
allowing researchers to describe the functioning of the criminal justice system 
as a whole rather than generalizing from a few specific incidents or cases. 
Second, they carefully consider the problem of differentiating correlation from 
causation, making use of natural experiments to measure the causal effects of 
detention and resolving the sorting problem described above. Finally, they 
consider a broader range of outcomes, focusing not just on the resolution of the 
case at hand, but on long-term ramifications, such as future criminal activity, 
earnings, and unemployment. 
The takeaway from this new generation of studies is that pretrial detention 
has substantial downstream effects on both the operation of the criminal justice 
system and on defendants themselves, causally increasing the likelihood of a 
conviction, the severity of the sentence, and, in some jurisdictions, defendants’ 
likelihood of future contact with the criminal justice system. Detention also 
reduces future employment and access to social safety nets. This growing 
evidence of pretrial detention’s high costs should give impetus to reform efforts 
 
 2. Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts, AM. BAIL COALITION, 
http://www.americanbailcoalition.org/Resources/Pretrial-Release-Of-Felony-Defendants-In-State-
Courts/ [https://perma.cc/9G4E-R49V] (“Compared to release on recognizance, defendants on 
financial release were more likely to make all scheduled court appearances.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics 
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that increase due process protections to ensure detention is limited to only those 
situations where it is truly necessary and identify alternatives to detention that 
can better promote court appearance and public safety. 
I.  RECENT STUDIES MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 
Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang offer a notable recent example from this new 
line of research.4 The authors obtained administrative court records for 
Philadelphia and Miami-Dade counties covering the period from 2006 to 2014, 
ultimately resulting in an analysis sample of over 300,000 cases in Philadelphia 
and nearly 100,000 in Miami-Dade.5 The court records provide information 
about bail, nonappearance, case outcomes, and future offending.6 To these data, 
the researchers link individual-level IRS tax data, recording earnings and 
employment information. To obtain causal estimates, the researchers exploit 
the random assignment of bail magistrates to cases, empirically demonstrating 
that defendant and case characteristics are uncorrelated with judge assignment. 
But because judges vary in the leniency with which they apply bail guidelines, 
judge assignment influences the ultimate likelihood that individual defendants 
are detained pretrial.7 This natural experiment furnishes an opportunity to 
measure outcomes for otherwise similar pools of defendants who vary in their 
access to pretrial release. Thus, as would be the case in a randomized clinical 
trial, the authors can measure the causal effect of pretrial detention. 
Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang demonstrate that pretrial detention reduces the 
likelihood of FTA by sixteen percentage points, but that this improvement in 
appearance rates comes with substantial ancillary consequences.8 Detention 
increases defendants’ likelihood of pleading guilty from 33% to 44% (a 32% 
increase), and the reductions in rearrest that accrue from incapacitating 
defendants pretrial are completely offset by increases in post-trial offending.9 
As of three to four years post-adjudication, detention reduces the likelihood of 
employment from 47% to 38% (a 20% decrease) and reduces defendants’ 
likelihood of accessing social safety net programs like the earned income tax 
credit.10 
These findings are in keeping with several other recent studies of pretrial 
detention. For example, Gupta, Hansman, and Frenchman use data from 
 
 4. Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, 
Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 201 
(2018). 
 5. Id. at 210. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 217–19. 
 8. Id. at 224–30. 
 9. Id. at 212, 214, 224–25. 
 10. Id. at 212, 214, 227–30. 
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Pittsburgh and Philadelphia and also exploit the randomization of defendants 
to bail magistrates to measure the effects of a cash bail condition (as compared 
to release on recognizance or nonmonetary conditions) on outcomes.11 They 
find that cash bail increases conviction likelihood from 50% to 56% (a 12% 
increase),12 does not measurably reduce nonappearance (at least as captured by 
an imperfect proxy of bench warrants),13 and increases future crime by 9%.14 
Also using data from Philadelphia, Stevenson shows that detention, in 
particular, increases the likelihood of conviction by 13%,15 lengthens sentences 
by 42%,16 and increases fees owed to the court (other than bail) by 41%.17 Leslie 
and Pope confirm these patterns in a study of nearly one million criminal cases 
in New York City, demonstrating that detention increases the probability of 
conviction by 20% (thirteen percentage points) for felony cases and 11% (seven 
percentage points) for misdemeanor cases and more than doubles average 
incarceration sentence length.18 The data also shows that a substantial fraction 
of the Black-White and Hispanic-White disparity in incarceration rates can be 
attributed to pretrial detention.19 Turning to the federal system, Didwania 
demonstrates, using a sample of over 100,000 federal defendants, that detention 
substantially increases sentence length and reduces the likelihood that 
defendants receive substantial assistance20 sentencing credits.21 
All of these studies use the random assignment of bail magistrates to cases 
to address the sorting problem and measure causal effects. Heaton, Stevenson, 
and Mayson take a different approach by demonstrating—using a sample of 
nearly 400,000 misdemeanor cases in Harris County, Texas—that defendants 
arraigned on a day closer to the weekend are more likely to be released than 
those arraigned earlier in the week, despite being assigned identical bail 
amounts and appearing otherwise similar on observable characteristics.22 These 
differences in detention plausibly result from the fact that obtaining release 
 
 11. Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: 
Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 472 (2016). 
 12. Id. at 487. 
 13. Id. at 496–97. 
 14. Id. at 495. 
 15. Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability To Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 
34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 532 (2018). 
 16. Id. at 535. 
 17. Id. at 534. 
 18. Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: 
Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. ECON. 529, 543, 547 (2017). 
 19. Id. at 551. 
 20. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 21. Stephanie Holmes Didwania, The Immediate Consequences of Pretrial Detention 4 (June 3, 
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 22. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of 
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 756 (2017). 
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requires someone else to show up to post bail, which is logistically harder on 
weekdays due to scheduling and liquidity constraints. Such logistical challenges 
are likely unrelated to the underlying guilt or innocence of defendants but do 
affect how cases are ultimately resolved, as would be expected if pretrial 
detention causally impacts outcomes. In this study, detention is shown to 
increase the likelihood of pleading guilty from 53% to 66% (a 25% increase) and 
more than double sentence length.23 While initially reducing crime through 
incapacitation, as of eighteen months post-hearing, detention increases felony 
offending by 30% and misdemeanor offending by 23%.24 Misdemeanor cases 
present a particular problem for bail policy due to the possibility that pretrial 
detention can cause defendants to essentially accrue their entire expected 
sentence while awaiting trial, a situation which creates perverse incentives for 
innocent defendants to plead guilty to crimes that they did not commit to 
shorten their jail stay.25 
To summarize, a robust collection of empirical studies using high-quality 
administrative data, spanning multiple jurisdictions and years, and 
encompassing different research designs provides consistent evidence that 
pretrial policies have important downstream consequences. Release conditions 
causally affect the guilt/innocence determination, sentence length, and the 
future economic prospects of defendants. Detention can also increase future 
crime, meaning that the prospect of incapacitation in the near term must be 
balanced against future crime in assessing whether regimes that act to detain 
truly protect or instead actually harm public safety. 
II.  STUDIES’ IMPLICATIONS FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION SYSTEMS 
These findings carry important implications for legal challenges to existing 
pretrial systems and their design more broadly. First, because the decision to 
detain will, in effect, be a decision to convict for some defendants, the process 
of determining who gets detained requires the robust procedural protections 
that apply in other phases of the criminal process.26 For example, it is well 
established that the Sixth Amendment requires access to counsel in criminal 
cases where imprisonment is imposed,27 but the “critical stage” analysis applied 
by the Supreme Court to preliminary stages of the adjudication process has yet 
 
 23. Id. at 747. 
 24. Id. at 718, 761–66. 
 25. Id. at 715–16, 784–86; see also Shima Baradaran Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. 
REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2020) (manuscript at 11, 16–17, 17 n.69) (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review) (arguing that pretrial policy should operate differently depending on whether a defendant is 
accused of a misdemeanor or a felony). 
 26. See Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d 296, 312 (E.D. La. 2018), aff’d, 937 F.3d 525 (5th Cir. 
2019). 
 27. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 
37–38 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963). 
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to be definitively extended to bail hearings.28 Given the now-robust body of 
evidence showing that the outcome of the bail hearing, if detention, can have as 
its practical result the imposition of a jail sentence, it seems pertinent that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel should extend to such hearings. 
Second, lack of individualization in bail procedures also raises concerns. 
Many jurisdictions continue to rely heavily on bail schedules that set 
presumptive bail amounts based on current charge severity and/or prior 
criminal history.29 Such schedules, which do not take into account ability to 
pay,30 will necessarily detain some fraction of criminal defendants, which will 
again have the practical effect of determining guilt for some. It seems obvious 
that an adjudication process that convicts defendants because they belong to a 
broadly defined group—without an individualized inquiry into their 
circumstances—would raise serious due process concerns. The pretrial process 
creates something close to such a system today in many communities. 
Third, critics of existing bail procedures have also attacked them on equal 
protection grounds.31 Several new-generation studies demonstrate that the 
burdens of pretrial detention are disproportionately borne by low-income 
individuals or minorities. Heaton, Mayson, and Stevenson, for example, show 
that, compared to defendants assigned identical cash bail amounts (who thus 
presumably represent the exact same degree of “risk” from the perspective of 
the court), defendants residing in the poorest 10% of zip codes are detained 1.6 
times as often as those residing in the wealthiest 10% of zip codes.32 Leslie and 
Pope demonstrate that the adverse causal effects of being detained pretrial are 
similar for Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites, but Black felony defendants are 
fourteen percentage points (roughly 45%) more likely to be detained than White 
defendants, and Hispanic felony defendants are nine percentage points 
(roughly 30%) more likely to be detained than White defendants.33 Arnold, 
Dobbie, and Yang apply an outcomes test to bail decisions in Miami and 
Philadelphia to test for racial bias.34 In essence, their test examines whether 
Black defendants experience bail failures at a lower rate than similarly situated 
White defendants, which should not occur if magistrates are optimizing their 
 
 28. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 
404 (1977); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967). 
 29. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF COUNTY 
PRETRIAL RELEASE POLICIES, PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES 7 (2009), https://university.pretrial.org/
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=bb5a2ba0-6c0a-eb4d-816a-
3c8083e5e388&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/22AN-L5CV] (indicating that, as of 2009, 64% of the 
most populous counties in the nation used bail schedules). 
 30. Id. at 6. 
 31. See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 32. Heaton et al., supra note 22, at 741. 
 33. Leslie & Pope, supra note 20, at 550–51. 
 34. David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 
1885, 1888 (2018). 
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bail decisions absent racial discrimination.35 They find that rearrest rates for 
White defendants at the margin of release—that is, those just above the 
threshold separating those who get released from those who are detained—are 
twenty-three percentage points higher than those for marginal Black 
defendants, a pattern strongly suggestive of racial bias against Blacks.36 
As these studies demonstrate, pretrial detention disproportionately 
impacts racial minorities and the poor, meaning that these groups bear the brunt 
of higher conviction rates, longer sentences, and other adverse collateral 
consequences that flow from detention. The uneven application of pretrial 
detention has triggered constitutional equal protection challenges to cash bail 
systems in several jurisdictions.37 Although litigation is ongoing, courts have 
indicated a willingness to invalidate pretrial detention regimes on equal 
protection grounds when there is strong evidence that they produce wealth-
based discrimination in application.38 
Defenders of the status quo contend that the large volume of cases flowing 
through the criminal justice system necessitates shortcuts such as bail schedules, 
uncounseled hearings, or reliance on private bail enforcement; without such 
shortcuts, they argue, the pretrial process would become intolerably protracted 
or costly.39 Under this view, pretrial process simplifications serve to get 
defendants to pretrial release more quickly and thus actually mitigate the harms 
of pretrial detention. However, the close—indeed causal—relationship between 
detention and conviction demonstrated in recent research renders this view 
problematic. Few would argue that abrogating constitutional protections, such 
 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. To understand why this suggests bias, notice that, by definition, for those on the margin 
of being released, a decisionmaker should be roughly indifferent as to whether they are released or 
detained. Absent any discrimination, this indifference should imply that the decisionmaker could 
detain one additional White defendant and release one additional Black defendant without any loss of 
utility. Doing so would have the benefit of reducing the rearrest rate because the marginal Black 
defendant has a lower rearrest rate than the marginal White defendant. The fact that decisionmakers 
do not make this seemingly efficiency-enhancing exchange suggests that the utilities are not balanced 
as would be the case if the decisionmakers were racially neutral. 
 37. See Alexander Bunin, The Demise of Money Bail, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2018, at 11, 12. 
 38. See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 163 (5th Cir. 2018) (“In sum, the essence of the 
district court’s equal protection analysis can be boiled down to the following: take two misdemeanor 
arrestees who are identical in every way—same charge, same criminal backgrounds, same circumstances, 
etc.—except that one is wealthy and one is indigent. Applying the County’s current custom and 
practice, with their lack of individualized assessment and mechanical application of the secured bail 
schedule, both arrestees would almost certainly receive identical secured bail amounts. One arrestee is 
able to post bond, and the other is not. As a result, the wealthy arrestee is less likely to plead guilty, 
more likely to receive a shorter sentence or be acquitted, and less likely to bear the social costs of 
incarceration. The poor arrestee, by contrast, must bear the brunt of all of these, simply because he has 
less money than his wealthy counterpart. The district court held that this state of affairs violates the 
equal protection clause, and we agree.”). 
 39. Effectiveness and Cost, AM. BAIL COALITION, http://ambailcoalition.org/effectiveness-and-
cost/ [https://perma.cc/WKX8-QHB6]. 
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as confrontation of witnesses or the reasonable doubt standard, would be an 
appropriate way to address the crush of high criminal caseloads, even if doing 
so would help some innocent defendants escape the criminal process sooner. 
Such protections are viewed as essential to ensure the integrity of the 
guilt/innocence determination. Jettisoning constitutional protections in the 
pretrial context, we now know, raises similar concerns because of the close 
connection between what happens in the bail hearing and the verdict that will 
ultimately be recorded. 
What other lessons does this new raft of empirical research hold for those 
attempting to improve current practices? Empirical data shows more 
definitively than ever that pretrial detention carries high costs—not simply in 
terms of the fiscal burdens associated with housing people during their term of 
pretrial custody, although these are considerable,40 but also through increases in 
wrongful convictions, augmented future criminal activity, and impairment of 
defendants’ future economic outcomes.41 While ensuring court appearance is a 
legitimate policy objective, in light of these high costs, pretrial detention should 
only be a final resort used sparingly and only after other less costly alternatives 
prove ineffective. A corollary is that investments that reduce reliance on pretrial 
detention—by, for example, diverting some defendants away from the criminal 
justice system toward social services,42 improving the information available to 
decisionmakers at the initial bail hearing,43 or providing supportive services to 
enable defendants to make it to court44—may generate net savings even if they 
 
 40. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2017); 
Bernadette Rabuy, Pretrial Detention Costs $13.6 Billion Each Year, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 7, 
2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/02/07/pretrial_cost/ [https://perma.cc/3SVC-2NFN]. 
 41. See supra Part I. 
 42. An example of a promising practice in this area is Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion 
(“LEAD”). See KATHERINE BECKETT, LAW, SOC’YS & JUSTICE PROGRAM & DEP’T OF 
SOCIOLOGY, UNIV. OF WASH., SEATTLE’S LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTED DIVERSION PROGRAM: 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FIRST TWO YEARS 3, 17, 41–46 (2014), 
https://www.fordfound.org/media/2543/2014-lead-process-evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BCK-
E3FB]; see also Susan E. Collins, Heather S. Lonczak & Seema L. Clifasefi, Seattle’s Law Enforcement 
Assisted Diversion (LEAD): Program Effects on Recidivism Outcomes, 64 EVALUATION & PROGRAM 
PLAN. 49, 49–50, 52–53, 55 (2017). 
 43. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT: SCIENCE PROVIDES GUIDANCE 
ON ASSESSING DEFENDANTS 5–6 (2015), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/
PJCC/Pretrial%20risk%20assessment%20science%20provides%20guidance%20on%20assessing%20def
endants.ashx [https://perma.cc/2B5Q-D2V8]. 
 44. See, e.g., BRICE COOKE ET AL., UNIV. OF CHI. CRIME LAB & IDEAS42, USING BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES: PREVENTING FAILURES TO APPEAR IN 
COURT 16–18 (2018), https://urbanlabs.uchicago.edu/attachments/3b31252760b28d3b
44ad1a8d964d0f1e9128af34/store/9c86b123e3b00a5da58318f438a6e787dd01d66d0efad54d66aa232a64
73/I42-954_NYCSummonsPaper_Final_Mar2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDX4-2XC9] (court 
reminders via text message); Rochelle Olson, Who Says There’s No Free Ride? Grant Will Get Public 
Defender Clients to Court, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis Oct. 31, 2018, 7:38 PM), 
http://www.startribune.com/who-says-there-s-no-free-ride-grant-will-get-public-defender-clients-to-
court/499213381/ [https://perma.cc/46LQ-4S2L]. 
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require appreciable upfront investments to establish or continuing funding to 
operate.45 The growing, high-quality evidence showing that pretrial detention 
reaches further and costs more than was previously recognized should stoke new 
urgency in efforts to ensure that “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to 
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”46  
 
 45. See Heaton et al., supra note 22, at 787 (noting that Harris County, Texas, could have averted 
$20 million in supervision costs by releasing criminal defendants who were detained pretrial and would 
have otherwise been releasable after paying $50). 
 46. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
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